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IN  RECENT  PUBLIC  DISCUSSION  of labor income  in the United  States, 
considerable  concern  has been voiced  that real wages  are not keeping 
up with productivity growth (or are declining), that sharply rising fringe 
benefit costs are undermining gains in take-home pay, and that workers 
in other countries are enjoying better pay increases  than U.S.  workers. 
Two frequently cited measures published by the Bureau of Labor Statis- 
tics  (BLS),  which  are shown  in figure 1, highlight some  of these  con- 
cerns. 
The first measure-the  growth  in real hourly compensation  in the 
nonfarm business  sector-has  slowed to 0.4 percent a year from 2.4 per- 
cent  a year  over  the  1960-73  period.  Meanwhile,  hourly  output  per 
worker has grown at 0.9 percent a year-noticeably  faster than hourly 
compensation,  although  down  considerably  from  its  1960-73  annual 
growth rate of 2.5 percent.  In an economy  where real wage growth has 
paralleled the rise in productivity over the long run, this apparent diver- 
gence implies that the benefits of increased productivity have not been 
distributed in the expected  way over the past two decades. 
The second  BLS  measure-real  hourly earnings of nonsupervisory 
employees-excludes  employer payments for pension,  health care, em- 
ployment taxes, and other nonwage costs that are counted in real hourly 
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Figure 1.  Productivity and Real Hourly Wages,  1960-93a 
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Source:  Authors' calculations  based on U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics  (1994) and U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
consumer  price index. 
a.  Productivity  is  output  per worker-hour  for  nonfarm business  deflated  by  the  output  deflator for that  sector. 
Real  hourly  compensation  for  nonfarm  business  and  real  hourly  earnings  for  private  nonagricultural  production 
workers and nonsupervisory  workers  are deflated using the CPI for urban workers. 
compensation.  This measure has actually declined by a startling 15 per- 
cent since  1973. This difference between  real hourly compensation  and 
real hourly earnings is often attributed either to the rising costs  of wage 
supplements,  particularly medical insurance,  or to a widening gap be- 
tween the wage rates of nonsupervisory  versus supervisory workers. 
These two measures of labor earnings, and the comparisons between 
them and productivity,  are often flawed, however,  by inconsistencies  in 
how the data are presented,  biases in the survey of hourly earnings, and 
differences among the price indexes used to adjust for inflation. In what 
follows,  we isolate some of these factors to arrive at a more meaningful 
assessment  of U.S.  real wage growth and its relation to productivity.  In 
the final section  of the paper, we also compare U.S.  wage growth with 
that in other industrial countries. 
Trends in U.S. Productivity Growth and Real Compensation 
The divergence  since  1973 between  real wage growth and productiv- 
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Table 1.  Productivity and Real Wages in the Nonfarm Business Sector,  1960-93 
Percent per year 
Indicatot  a  1960-73  1973-93  1973-83  1983-93 
Hourly compensation  (CPI)  2.4  0.4  0.2  0.5 
Productivity (NFGDP)  2.5  0.9  0.6  1.2 
Hourly compensation  (NFGDP)  2.5  0.8  0.5  1.0 
Hourly compensation  (PCE)  2.4  0.6  0.9  0.3 
Hourly fringe benefits (PCE)  6.0  1.9  3.8  0.6 
Hourly wage (PCE)  2.0  0.4  0.4  0.3 
Alternative  deflator-s 
PCE implicit  3.1  5.8  7.7  4.0 
NFGDP  3.1  5.6  8.1  3.3 
CPI-U (urban consumers)  3.2  6.1  8.4  3.8 
CPI-W (urban workers)  3.1  6.0  8.4  3.6 
CPI-U-X  (adjusted)  3.0  5.8  7.8  3.8 
PCE (fixed-weight)  2.5  5.7  7.3  4.0 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on  U.S.  Bureau of  Labor Statistics  (1994); U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
consumer  price index; and the National  Income  and Prodtict Accounts  (NIPA). 
a.  Computed using the consumer  price index (CPI), the personal consumption  expenditures  (PCE) deflator, or the 
output price deflator for nonfarm business  (NFGDP)  as indicated in parentheses. 
the way productivity gains have been distributed historically.  This can 
be seen by decomposing  the divergence  in those data into two parts-a 
sharp fall in labor's terms of trade, meaning that the prices workers pay 
for goods  have been rising faster than the prices of the goods they pro- 
duce,  and a small decline  in real compensation  relative to productivity 
when both are deflated using a common price index. 
These  points are quantified in table  1. The first two lines report the 
growth of real hourly compensation  and productivity in the private non- 
farm business  sector as reported by BLS.2 They show that productivity 
growth fell sharply off its historical rate after 1973, accounting for most 
of the slowdown  in real wage  growth.  The published  measure  of real 
hourly compensation  slowed  even  more than productivity  after  1973, 
mainly because the consumer price index (CPI) used to deflate compen- 
sation grew faster than the output deflator used to deflate productivity. 
The third line of table 1 shows  hourly compensation  deflated by the 
output deflator (NFGDP) instead of the CPI. Since 1973, this measure of 
2.  The index of productivity  is most commonly  computed  using a concept  of hours 
paid for all persons, which includes an estimate for the self-employed.  A comparable mea- 
sure of wages is obtained by imputing a wage rate to the self-employed  that equals that of 
employees  in specific industries.  For nonfarm business,  there is no significant difference 
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real compensation,  which is often referred to as the real product wage, 
has grown about 0.1 percent a year more slowly than labor productivity. 
This small difference is the extent of the genuine departure from average 
historical experience. 
Differences  between the growth of productivity and the growth of the 
real product wage reflect variations in labor's share of total nonfarm in- 
come.  Labor's  share of nonfarm income,  which has averaged 65.7 per- 
cent over the postwar period and which is slightly procyclical,  peaked at 
67.8 percent in 1980 and 1982 and declined  to 65 percent by 1993. The 
near constancy  of labor's share of nonfarm income  in the long run has 
been used by economists  to justify the use of the Cobb-Douglas produc- 
tion function in modeling the long-run behavior of pricing, production, 
and factor use. The small decline in labor's share since  1982, which was 
preceded by a small rise, does not call into question this long-run charac- 
teristic. 
Measuring  Price  Changes 
We now look more closely  at alternative price indexes used to adjust 
for  inflation. 
CPI versus PCE Deflator 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics  uses  the CPI for urban households 
(CPI-U) to adjust hourly compensation and uses the CPI for urban work- 
ers (CPI-W) to adjust hourly earnings. Both indexes,  however,  have ex- 
perienced a major change in their construction that severely distorts the 
historical trend. Prior to 1983, all versions  of the CPI measured home- 
ownership costs  by assigning a large weight to changes in mortgage in- 
terest rates, even though such changes would affect only a small number 
of households.  Starting in 1983 for the CPI-U and in 1985 for the CPI-W, 
the BLS  changed the housing component  of the index to a concept  of 
rental equivalency,  in which  the costs  to homeowners  change  in line 
with the rental rates for comparable housing.  Because  the changeover 
occurred at a cyclical  peak in mortgage interest  rates,  the CPI, when 
compared  with  alternative  indexes,  increases  much  more  during the 
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Figure 2.  Relationships among Various Price Series,  1960-93a 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics  (1994); U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
consumer  price index;  and the National  Income  and Product Accounts  (NIPA). 
a.  The CPI-U is the consumer  price index for urban consumers.  The output deflator is for nonfarm business.  The 
PCE deflator is the personal consumption  expenditures  deflator. 
and does  not decline  during the subsequent  period when interest rates 
fell. As a result of the changed methodology,  the CPI greatly overstates 
the rise in the price level and understates real wage gains since the late 
1970s. 
For this reason, we choose  to use another deflator, the personal con- 
sumption expenditures implicit deflator (PCE deflator) from the national 
accounts, to measure consumer price changes; it is conceptually  equiva- 
lent to the output deflator used to measure productivity,  and it provides 
a historically consistent  measure of price changes.  In addition to their 
treatments of housing costs,  the CPI and PCE deflator also differ in the 
weights attached to specific  consumption  items.  For example,  the CPI 
only reflects out-of-pocket  costs  for health care, whereas  the PCE de- 
flator treats employer and government payments as income transfers to 
households  and reflects  the  full  cost  of  health  care  as  consumption. 
Also,  the individual expenditure weights  used to construct the CPI are 
adjusted infrequently, whereas the PCE deflator is constructed to reflect 
shifts in the composition  of  spending among major expenditure  cate- 
gories.  As shown in figure 2, the discrepancy  between  the CPI-U  and 322  Br-ookings  Paper  s on Economic  Activity,  1:1994 
PCE deflator increased  throughout the  1970s, peaked  at 9 percent  in 
1982, and still amounted to about 5 percent in 1993. 
Changes  in Labor's  Ter-ms  of  Trade 
Yet, even when measured by the PCE deflator, the prices that work- 
ers pay as consumers  have been rising significantly more rapidly than 
the prices of the products they produce.  This important change in rela- 
tive prices, what we call labor's terms of trade, is shown by the change 
in the ratio of the nonfarm output deflator to the PCE deflator in figure 
2. It indicates that while the terms of trade improved by 3 percent over 
the 1973-83 period-generating  real wage gains in excess  of productiv- 
ity growth-this  has been followed  by a dramatic 6 percent decline  in 
labor's terms of trade over the past decade. Thus, real hourly compensa- 
tion, using the PCE deflator, has grown at only one-quarter the rate of 
labor productivity  since  1983-0.3  percent  a year compared  with  1.2 
percent a year. 
The size of the change in workers' terms of trade is surprising and un- 
precedented  in the  historical  data.  Because  consumption  constitutes 
such a large part of total output, the two indexes  normally move closely 
together.  Moreover,  two likely sources for the divergence  can be ruled 
out. First, the external terms of trade with other countries played no sig- 
nificant role in the relative price movements  within the United  States. 
The relative price of imports did rise and fall with changes in oil prices, 
but there has been little net change since  1980, despite the variations in 
the dollar's exchange rate. Second,  there has been no significant change 
in the relative price of farm products. 
Instead, two other developments  help explain the change in relative 
prices: the decline in the prices of computers,  which are produced in the 
nonfarm business  sector but are a very small part of consumption;  and 
the sharp rise after 1982 in the cost  of owner-occupied  housing,  which 
is a large element in consumption  but is largely excluded  from nonfarm 
business  output.3 Price indexes  that exclude  both computers and hous- 
ing costs show that these two items indeed account for almost half of the 
rise in the relative price of consumption products since 1982. Of the total 
7 percentage point difference between the growth in consumption prices 
and the growth in nonfarm output prices between  1982 and 1993, com- 
3. Lawrence  and  Slaughter  (1993). Barry Bosworth and George L. Perty  323 
puters account for 1.8 percentage points and rent accounts  for another 
1.4 percentage points. 
What accounts for the remaining 3.8 percentage points? They appear 
to reflect a pervasive  pattern in which the prices of a wide range of in- 
vestment  goods and government purchases from the private sector de- 
clined relative to consumption prices. In addition, within total consump- 
tion, the prices of services  have risen relative to the prices of goods.  To 
try to identify in greater detail which other consumption categories con- 
tributed to the divergence,  we  regressed  the price indexes  of detailed 
consumer expenditure components  on the private nonfarm deflator and 
a trend for the 1960-82 period and examined the forecast errors over the 
1983-93  period  for  atypical  increases.  Although  the  resulting  errors 
were  generally  small,  they  were  consistent  with  the  observed  diver- 
gence between the aggregate PCE and output deflators when cumulated 
over all components.4 
Other Price  Measures 
Some  other price  indexes  are occasionally  used  to construct  mea- 
sures of real wage changes.  Their behavior over the past two decades 
is summarized in the lower part of table  1. First, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics  estimates  a CPI based on a historically  consistent  methodol- 
ogy for measuring homeownership  costs  (CPI-U-X) but does not use it 
in its published measures  of real wage growth. This index has actually 
risen slightly less rapidly than the PCE deflator from 1960 to 1993. Sec- 
ond, the strong similarity between changes in the CPI-U and the CPI-W 
indicates a minor role for their different expenditure  weights.  Finally, 
as mentioned previously,  changes  in the price deflators in the national 
accounts  reflect changes  in the composition  of gross domestic  product 
as well as price changes.  The effect of these  changes  in composition  is 
excluded  from the fixed-weight  PCE deflator in the national accounts, 
which rises more slowly  than the PCE deflator up to the base period of 
1987 and rises faster thereafter.5 
4. The  prices  of medical  care  were  not a significant  source  of change  in the relationship 
between  consumption  prices  and  the output  deflator.  They have been rising  more  rapidly 
than  other  prices  for a long  time. 
5. This result  is unsurprising  since, compared  with the dating  of weights used in the 
fixed-weight  deflator,  the output  weights  used to construct  the PCE (implicit)  deflator  are 
earlier  in the years  before 1987  and  later  thereafter.  The difference  is less in the CPI-U-X 
because  the  weights  are  periodically  revised  and  the resulting  indexes  are  spliced  together. 
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The main  point  remains  that  using  the CPI  (either  the U or W version) 
to measure  real wage changes results in a dramatic  understatement  of 
real wage growth from 1973 to 1982 and an overstatement  thereafter. 
Since most of the difference arises from a known inconsistency in the 
historical  CPI, the emphasis on this index in the published  statistics is 
unfortunate.  The PCE deflator  provides a more consistent measure  of 
the price inflation  affecting  consumers, particularly  for the purpose of 
comparing  real  wages and labor  productivity. 
Measuring Wages 
This section looks at the main  alternative  measures  of wage change  in 
the United States and explains some of the factors responsible  for the 
differences  among  them. 
Role  of Fr-inge Benefits 
Wages  differ  from  compensation  in that  they do not include  employer 
contributions  for social insurance,  pension  contributions,  and  employer 
payments  for health insurance  and other fringe  benefits. The growth  of 
all these payments is widely blamed  for the divergence between mea- 
sures of total compensation  and take-home  pay. Yet, as shown in figure 
3, their role is smaller  than commonly supposed because not all these 
wage supplements  have grown. For example, employment  taxes, which 
rose rapidly  in the early 1970s,  were quite stable in the 1980s, whereas 
employer  payments  for health  insurance  have been rising  swiftly  for sev- 
eral  decades and  now match  employment  taxes in size. In addition,  there 
has been a less well-known  offsetting  decline in employer  contributions 
to private  pension  programs.  That  slowdown reflects  the decline in pen- 
sion costs during  the 1980s, when rising returns  on pension portfolios 
and a shift to defined  contribution  pensions, primarily  401(k)  plans, al- 
lowed employers to cut their contributions.  Overall, fringe  benefits in- 
creased from 8 percent of total compensation  in 1960, to 16 percent in 
1979,  to 17  percent  by 1993. 
Although BLS does not normally  publish a measure of the hourly 
wage  excluding  supplements  in its report  on productivity  and  compensa- 
tion  in the nonfarm  business sector, it is easy to construct  the series  from Barry Bosworth and George L. Per,y  325 
Figure 3.  Wage Supplements,  1960-92 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on the National  Income  and Product Accounts  (NIPA). 
information  published  in the national  accounts. The major  advantage  of 
this measure  is that it is fully comparable,  in terms of data sources and 
definitions,  with hourly  compensation. 
The change  in the index of the hourly  wage rate (excluding  benefits), 
using the PCE deflator  to adjust  for inflation,  is shown in the sixth row 
of table 1. Over  the 1960-73  period,  hourly  wages grew at an annual  rate 
of 2.0 percent,  compared  with 2.4 percent  for hourly  compensation.  The 
differential  widened slightly in the following decade when both mea- 
sures slowed, but since 1983  it has disappeared,  with hourly  wages and 
hourly  compensation  both growing  by 0.3 percent  annually. 
Other Wage Indexes 
There are two other major sources of information  about aggregate 
wage rate trends, both from the Bureau  of Labor Statistics. One is the 
long-published  measure  of hourly earnings  of nonsupervisory  employ- 
ees, which is part  of its monthly  survey of business establishments  and 
which was shown in figure 1. This measure  is constructed  in a fashion 
similar  to the wage rate from the national  accounts-the  wage bill di- 326  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1994 
Table 2.  Alternative Measures of Real Hourly Wages,  1976-93a 
Percent per year 
Sector  and  measur-e  1976-93  1976-83  1983-93 
Private  industry worker 
Hourly compensation,  national accountsb  0.5  0.5c  0.4 
Hourly compensation,  ECI  0.5  1.2c  0.2 
Hourly wages,  national accountsb  0.3  0.4  0.3 
Hourly wages,  ECI  -  0.1  0.0  -0.3 
Prodluction and nonsuper-visoty workers 
Hourly earnings (published,  CPI)b  -0.6  -0.8  -0.5 
Hourly earnings (PCE)  -0.6  -  0.1  -0.9 
Hourly wages,  ECI  -  0.1  0.2  -  0.4 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on  U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics  (1994); U.S.  Bureau of  Labor Statistics, 
employment  cost  index; and U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics,  consumer  price index. 
a.  All  series  are deflated  by the  PCE deflator except  for hourly earnings  (published,  CPI),  which  is  deflated  by 
the consumer  price index for urban workers (CPI-W). 
b.  The figures are as published by the BLS for the nonfarm business  sector. 
c.  Data begin in 1980. 
vided  by total  hours  paid.  The other  source  is the employment  cost index 
(ECI), which reports  measures  of hourly compensation  since 1980  and 
wage rates since 1975. The major  advantage  of the ECI is that it is a 
fixed-weight  Laspeyres index, with a June 1989  base period, that cor- 
rects for the effects of shifts  in employment  between high-wage  and  low- 
wage  jobs. As an index, it is therefore  conceptually  close to the CPI. 
Another difference is that the ECI is an index of wages per hours 
worked, whereas  the other measures  are based on hours  paid-a  differ- 
ence that shifts some payments  from wages to benefits in the ECI. For 
example, increases in vacation time and overtime premiums are re- 
ported as gains in benefits, not wages, in the ECI. Also, compensation 
costs in the ECI refer  only to costs associated with current  employees, 
excluding such items as retiree  health costs. Table 2 summarizes  these 
measures of real wage and compensation  trends, together with others 
described  above, all deflated  by the PCE deflator. 
Between its inception in 1980 and 1993, the ECI has registered a 
change in hourly compensation  that is similar  to the change in hourly 
compensation  recorded in the national  accounts. However, there are 
significant  differences  over shorter  periods. Some of the discrepancies 
can be traced to different  methodologies;  some to shifts in the mix of 
high-wage  and low-wage  jobs in the economy, which is known to have 
significant  effects on average compensation;  and some to the greater Barry Bosworth and George L. Periy  327 
weight  placed on fringe  benefit  costs in the ECI than in the national  ac- 
counts, which again  may reflect  a shifting  of employment  toward  work- 
ers with lower  fringe  benefit  costs. The result  is a larger  discrepancy  be- 
tween the two wage measures  when fringe  benefits are excluded.6  The 
wage rate  derived  from  the national  accounts data  also poses a problem 
in that the estimates of aggregate  wages and hours come from different 
data  sources. This is probably  an important  source of the short-run  vola- 
tility in those data. 
Among  the alternative  indexes in table 2, hourly  earnings  is the out- 
lier. We rule out several potential  explanations  for the weakness in this 
index, which, as published, shows a 10.3 percent decline in real wages 
between 1976  and 1993  (or a 9.3 percent  decline using  the PCE  deflator). 
First, because all the wage measures  are deflated  by consumer  prices- 
the CPI-W  for the published  hourly  earnings  index and  the PCE  deflator 
for all the rest-labor's  terms  of trade  are not a source of the differences 
between hourly earnings  and the other measures in the table. Second, 
although  the hourly  earnings  index includes  only production  and nonsu- 
pervisory  employees, the differences  between it and  the other  measures 
cannot be traced to higher wage increases for the excluded workers, 
who represent  only 19  percent  of the total  work  force. The decline in the 
ECI with the same coverage as the earnings  index is 2.7 percent, which 
is identical  to the change in the full ECI.7  Third,  we cannot  plausibly  at- 
tribute  the weakness in hourly earnings  to changes in the mix of high- 
and low-wage  jobs, since the real wage measure derived from the na- 
tional  accounts, which is also affected by changes in the mix, increased 
5.6 percent  between 1976  and 1993. 
The employment  and  earnings  data  used to construct  the hourly  earn- 
ings index are benchmarked  to the unemployment  insurance  tax data, 
which  are also used in compiling  the national  accounts' estimate  of total 
wage payments.  The national  accounts data also agree closely with the 
BLS data on the reported  number  of employees. Thus, the differences 
in the measured  wage rate must arise from a different  treatment  of the 
6. Data  on the composition  of benefits  are available  only since 1987.  From  that  infor- 
mation,  it would appear  that the difference  between the two wage series cannot be ex- 
plained  by differences  in annual  leave and  supplemental  pay. Furthermore,  there  has been 
no major  change  in the ratio  of hours  worked  to hours  paid  over the period  in question. 
7. U.S. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics,  employment  cost index, 1993.  This  result  is more 
surprising  because the earnings  measure  includes  overtime  and vacation  pay, while the 
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wage bill in the annual  benchmark  adjustments.  While the BLS does 
benchmark  its employment  data on an annual  basis, it does not do the 
same for the hours and wage data. Since the monthly survey does not 
have a probability-based  design  for the inclusion  of firms,  it is very likely 
to develop persistent  biases in its measures  of hours  and  earnings,  which 
presently  go uncorrected.  Furthermore,  the continued  focus on nonsu- 
pervisory employees is difficult  to respond to for many firms, and it 
would be preferable  if the survey focused on the average wage of all 
workers.  The result  appears  to be an increasing  underestimation  of wage 
growth. 
What Should One Believe? 
We can draw several conclusions about prices and wages from the 
various measures available. First, real wages have stagnated  over the 
past two decades, but claims of a large  decline in the average  real wage 
are exaggerated.  Second, some widely used series are clearly deficient 
for some purposes. For example, because of the change  in how the CPI 
treats housing costs after 1982, it is a distorted measure of consumer 
prices over any period  spanning  this change  and, many  would argue,  for 
the period leading  up to that change, when mortgage  costs were rising 
sharply. Deflators  for personal consumption  expenditure  from the na- 
tional accounts do not have this problem. Since 1982, the differences 
between the the CPI and PCE deflator have diminished  but are still 
significant. 
Among  measures  of wages and  compensation,  the hourly  earnings  in- 
dex should  be dismissed  because it is based on sampling  techniques  that 
are not properly benchmarked, although in its favor it is available 
promptly  each month.  But if it is going  to be published,  the methodology 
should be improved  to make it a useful measure  of developments  over 
long periods. 
The ECI, by contrast,  is a well-designed  index of wages and compen- 
sation  that adjusts  for changes in the industrial  and occupational  mix of 
employment.  This makes it a good measure  of the changing  wage costs 
confronting  employers. For the same reason, however, it misses the ef- 
fect of changing  job opportunities;  by design, if the ratio  of high-paying 
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compensation  data  based on the national  accounts  offer  the opposite ad- 
vantages and disadvantages.  As measures  of wage costs to employers, 
they suffer  from mix effects, but changes in the mix of high- and low- 
paying  jobs are relevant  to evaluating  wage trends  fi-om  the perspective 
of workers.  And  they can be used to measure  changes  in labor's  share  of 
output. 
On two final  points, it would be helpful  if the report  on nonfarm  pro- 
ductivity  and hourly  compensation  were expanded  to include sepal-ate 
measures  of wages and wage supplements.  Furthermore,  the statistical 
agencies could do more to reconcile the differing measures of wage 
change. 
International Comparisons 
Growth in U.S. real compensation  has been low relative to that in 
other  industrial  economies, and  the difference  cannot  be explained  away 
by the kinds of corrections to the U.S. statistics that have been made 
thus far. Although  the data needed to make a detailed analysis are not 
available, the broad picture is clear. Table 3 compares U.S.  perfor- 
mance with that of six other industrial  nations:  Canada,  Great  Britain, 
France, Italy, Germany,  and Japan.8  For 1979-92, and the subperiods 
1979-85  and 1985-92,  real  compensation  per  worker  in the private  sector 
rose more slowly in the United States than  in any of the other  six econo- 
mies using  either  the PCE  deflator  or the GDP  (output)  deflator  to adjust 
nominal  compensation. 
Although  exchange rate movements do not explain the divergence 
between consumption and producer prices within the United States, 
comparing  the data in table 3 across the two subperiods  strongly sug- 
gests that  exchange rate movements  were important  in other countries. 
Over the  1979-85 period, when the dollar appreciated dramatically 
against  other currencies, U.S. real compensation  trailed that in other 
countries  by less when the PCE deflators  were used than  when the GDP 
deflators  were used. The reverse is true over the 1985-92  period, when 
the dollar  depreciated  just as dramatically. 
Using the PCE deflators,  annual  rates of increase in real compensa- 
8. For  comparability  with other  countries,  the U.S. output  data  in this section  refer  to 
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tion were noticeably faster in the second  period in all countries except 
the  United  States.  But  using  the  GDP  deflators,  the  evidence  of  a 
speedup in real compensation  is mixed across countries,  amounting to 
0.6 percentage point in the United States and averaging only 0.3 percent- 
age point elsewhere. 
We regard the GDP deflator as the most appropriate measure for de- 
flating labor compensation when comparing it across countries. It shows 
the annual rise in U.S.  real compensation per employee  (the real product 
wage) to be 1.2 percentage points slower than the average of the other 
countries over the 1979-85 period and 0.8 percentage point slower over 
the 1985-92 period. 
Differences  in productivity growth account for the differences  in the 
growth of real product wages between the United States and the average 
of the other countries  shown  in table 3.  In comparisons  between  the 
United  States  and individual countries,  only in the U.S.-Canada  com- 
parison does productivity  not account for all or most of the differential 
in real product wage growth.  Over a long interval, such as the 1969-92 
period shown in the top left panel of figure 4, there is little difference be- 
tween  the growth rates of productivity  and real product wages  in any 
country, indicating no trend in the labor share of output. But in the 1979- 
92 period, there are notable departures from this tendency  (and, implic- 
itly, offsetting departures in the previous decade).  In Canada and, by a 
small margin, Great Britain, compensation  grew faster than productiv- 
ity,  while  the opposite  is true in the other countries.  These  develop- 
ments  do not seem  to be  related to unemployment  rates,  which  rose 
everywhere  between  1979 and 1985, a development  usually associated 
with a constant or rising labor share. 
Emnployment  Gains 
While real wage gains of U.S.  workers have been modest relative to 
those of workers in other countries, they tell only part of the story of the 
relative performance of labor markets. Employment,  another gauge of 
worker welfare, rose faster in the United States than in any of the other 
countries between  1979 and 1992, and not simply because  the working- 
age population grew faster. Table 4 compares changes in the unemploy- 
ment rates and changes in the ratios of employment  to the working-age 
population across the seven  countries.  U.S.  performance was substan- 332  Br-ookings  Paper-s on Economic Activity,  1:1994 
Figure 4.  Changes in Productivity and the Real Product Wage,  1969-92a 
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tially  better  on  both  counts  than performance  in any  other  country 
except  Japan.  If  U.S.  performance  had just  matched  the  European 
average over this interval, the 1992 U.S.  unemployment rate would have 
been  9.9  percent  rather  than  7.4  percent,  and  employment  would 
have been lower by 9.6 million, with more than 6 million fewer workers 
even looking for jobs.  It is extremely  doubtful, however,  that the much 
slower job creation in the other economies  can be blamed on the faster 
increase in the real compensation  of their workers. As noted earlier, dif- 
ferent productivity trends largely explain the differences in real compen- 
sation growth across countries. 000  eee1 C  0\  11 
Cz  c"i  VN  ?,  os6  -4 4 
o. 
~ 00*c1~  ONCN  0'r  .O 
I2  I 
S  t  ~  N  -l  m  ?  000t 
z  t  q  'IC  0  "t  C\  o 
I  I  I 
u 
00  ON  ON  00  ON  ON  00  ON  ON  *~  ONO  ONb  ON  O Ni  N 
r-  00  0-  r-  00  r-  r-  00  r- 
.0ON  ON  ON  ON  ON  ON  ON  ON  ONo 
C\  C\  C  C\  \  C  C  0 
4408  08  8  m  0  08  080  Cu  .~~0  0  0  0  00  8 
o  o  o0 
c 
_0 
x 334  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
On the other hand, causality  in the other direction-from  poor job 
performance to lower take-home pay for workers-almost  surely exists. 
With higher employment-to-population  ratios,  the  costs  of  programs 
supporting those  without  work would  be lower  and would  be  spread 
over more workers. Consequently,  the tax burden per employed worker 
would be lower on both counts,  except  as the higher costs  are financed 
through larger budget deficits.  If U.S.  performance  had just  matched 
Europe's  as  described  above,  and  transfer  programs  were  financed 
through payroll taxes,  U.S.  payroll taxes per worker would have had to 
be 11.3 percent higher than they actually were, assuming only the costs 
of unemployment compensation  were affected on the expenditure  side. 
If other income  maintenance  transfers also  rose,  the needed  increase 
would be greater. And if part of the lower revenues  from income  and 
profits taxes  had to be made up, the tax burden on employed  workers 
would be higher still. 
Manufacturing  Coinpensation 
In manufacturing, shown in table 3, U.S.  real compensation  over the 
1979-92 period grew 1 percentage point more slowly than the average of 
real compensation  across  the other countries,  the same differential as 
existed  for economywide  compensation.  That long period of compari- 
son, however,  ignores a more recent change.  U.S.  productivity growth 
in manufacturing has improved since  1985 and matched the average of 
the other countries over the  1985-92 period. None  of this recent  U.S. 
improvement is reflected in real compensation  gains, however.  In fact, 
over the 1985-92 period, real compensation  gains in U.S.  manufacturing 
slowed  slightly, as they did in the other countries,  on average. 
Two inferences can be drawn from these patterns. First, manufactur- 
ing compensation  in the industrial economies  was less cyclically  sensi- 
tive  than  economywide  compensation-the  wedge  between  the  two 
widened  everywhere  during 1979-85,  when unemployment  was  rising 
most sharply. Second,  the dollar's appreciation and depreciation did not 
seem  to affect  the relation between  manufacturing compensation  and 
economywide  compensation.  The  wedge  between  the  two  widened 
more in the United States than elsewhere  when the dollar was appreciat- 
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have been expected  on the grounds that manufacturing is more sensitive 
to foreign competition than is total GDP. 
Looking Ahead 
These  broad comparisons  across  countries,  both in manufacturing 
and the economy  as a whole,  help illuminate past and expected  future 
differences  in their real wage growth. The differences  in compensation 
growth across countries  can be traced largely to different rates of pro- 
ductivity growth. However,  in recent years the productivity growth dif- 
ferential between  the United  States  and other industrial countries  lies 
largely in the nonmanufacturing sector,  as other countries have largely 
caught up with U.S.  productivity in manufacturing. The remaining gaps 
in the nonmanufacturing sector still leave room for economywide  gains 
in productivity  and real wages  to be larger abroad than in the United 
States. Comments 
and Discussion 
Matthew D. Shapiro: Growth in compensation has slowed dramati- 
cally since the productivity  slowdown. But in discussions of U.S. eco- 
nomic performance,  it is often claimed that real wages have actually 
fallen substantially  over the past two decades. This is surely not the 
case. Real wages are proportional  to productivity,  and productivity  is 
definitely  higher  now than  it was in the mid-  1970s. 
Bosworth and Perry's paper is a reexamination  of the data on real 
wages and  compensation.  Their  careful  data  analysis  will clarify  the dis- 
cussion  of real  wage growth  and  the relationship  between  real  wages and 
productivity. 
The claim that real wages are declining  arises from the behavior of 
the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics's series on real average  hourly  earnings. 
From 1972  to 1992, this measure of real wages fell by 13 percent. But 
this measure  understates  the growth  in the return  to an hour's work  for 
several  reasons. 
The BLS deflates  average  hourly  earnings  by the CPI  for urban  work- 
ers (CPI-W).  Prior  to 1985,  the CPI-W  had a home purchase  component 
that  rose with interest  rates  and  therefore  caused the price  index  to over- 
state inflation  in periods  when nominal  interest  rates were rising. When 
average  hourly earnings  are instead deflated  by the personal  consump- 
tion expenditures  deflator  in the national  accounts, real wages fell 10 
percent from 1972 to 1992. Thus, three percentage points of the pub- 
lished  decline in the BLS's real  earnings  series arises  from  the overstate- 
ment  of inflation  by the CPI, especially during  the late 1970s. 
The average hourly earnings  series includes only the wages of pro- 
duction and nonsupervisory  workers. The paper also discusses prob- 
lems with the sampling  and  benchmarking  of the series. Real wages and 
salaries  per hour  for all workers  grew 8 percent  from 1972  to 1992,  com- 
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pared  with the decline in real (PCE-deflated)  average  hourly  earnings  of 
10 percent. Finally, fringe benefits have accounted for an increasing 
share of compensation.  Real total compensation  per hour  grew 15  per- 
cent between 1972  and 1992-almost twice as fast as wages and salaries 
per hour. Hence, going  from  real  average  hourly  earnings  from  the BLS 
to PCE-deflated  compensation  per hour reverses the claim that the re- 
turn  to an hour's work has fallen for the representative  worker during 
the past two decades. 
Yet, the growth  of real  hourly  compensation  has been very slow com- 
pared with the early postwar period. PCE-deflated  compensation  per 
hour  grew 2.7 percent annually  from 1948  to 1972,  but only 0.6 percent 
a year since then. The decline in compensation  growth  is a direct  conse- 
quence of the productivity  slowdown. This point is well understood  by 
economists. But the central point of the Bosworth-Perry  paper is that 
the slowdown in PCE-deflated  compensation  per hour has been even 
greater  than the slowdown in productivity  growth. Since 1972, output 
per hour for nonfarm  business has grown 0.9 percent a year-a  third 
faster  than  PCE-deflated  compensation  per hour. 
The divergence  of real  compensation  growth  and  productivity  growth 
does not contradict  the implication  of economic theory  that  their  growth 
rates should  be equal. Rather,  as the paper  makes  quite  clear, once com- 
pensation is deflated  by the price index for output rather  than by the 
price index for consumption, productivity  and compensation  grow at 
about  the same rates. 
The paper  has little discussion  of the theoretical  reasons  for the diver- 
gence of the consumption  wage (hourly compensation  deflated  by the 
PCE deflator)  from the product  wage (hourly  compensation  deflated  by 
the output price deflator)  on the one hand and the coincidence of the 
product  wage  and  productivity  on the other. Before addressing  this issue 
in some detail,  it is worth  noting  some other  reasons  why wages and  pro- 
ductivity, at least as measured in the paper, might grow at different 
rates. 
Productivity  is measured  in the paper  as the average  product  of labor. 
Labor  earns its marginal  product.  In the usual balanced-growth  model, 
average  and  marginal  products  will grow  at the same  rate  in steady state. 
But if the economy is converging  to the steady state, or if no steady state 
exists (because of biased technological  progress, nonconstant  returns, 
or other  reasons), then average  and marginal  products  will diverge. For 338  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
the long time series averages that the authors  highlight,  examining  the 
average  product  of labor is probably  not a problem.  But the difference 
between average  and marginal  is worth  keeping  in mind  when consider- 
ing period-by-period  wage and  productivity  movements  and  for any ex- 
tensions of this work. 
Profit  maximization  implies  that  the marginal  product  of labor  should 
equal  the wage. Competition  in labor  markets  implies  that the wages of 
workers  across industries-controlling for differences  in the attributes 
of workers  and  for differences  in the amenities  ofjobs-should  be equal 
in different  industries.  If not, workers  would move across industries  un- 
til they were equalized.  I There are, however, huge differences in both 
the level and  growth  of output  per hour  across industries.  Differences  in 
capital-labor  ratios and in productivity  growth  are key sources of varia- 
tion in marginal  products  across industries. 
To use a classic general  examination  question,  consider  two workers: 
an airline  worker  who "parks"  planes  and  a barber.  Both might  need sim- 
ilar  years of vocational  training  and similar  intelligence  to do their  jobs. 
The barber's  output  per hour is roughly  fixed, and has been for centu- 
ries. The plane  parker's  output  per hour  can increase  dramatically.  Sup- 
pose he or she switches from  parking  727s to 747s. With  the same wave 
of the flashlight,  he or she is able  to bring  three  times as many  passengers 
safely to roost. The worker's  productivity  has tripled.  Should  his or her 
wage triple  relative  to its old level or relative  to the barber's?  The answer 
is no. If it did, many barbers  would become plane parkers, until the 
wages in the salon and on the tarmac  equalized. Does this violate the 
condition  that the marginal  product  equal the wage? Again, the answer 
is no. It is the product  wage that should equal the marginal  product  of 
labor. To the extent that there are efficiency gains from parking  747s 
compared  with parking  727s, the technological  improvement  should  de- 
press the price of airline  tickets, not raise the wage of airline  parkers. 
The predictions  of this theory  hold up quite  well when looking  across 
time and sectors. Consider  my figure  1. The top panel gives data  for the 
nonfarm nonmanufacturing  sector. The bottom panel gives data for 
manufacturing.  The solid lines denote productivity. Manufacturing 
1.  There is a well-known  literature that documents  interindustry wage  differentials 
that are not explained by differences in workers' attributes or jobs.  These industry effects 
are fairly stable across  time.  Since this paper is about the evolution  of wages over time, 
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Figure 1.  U.S.  Productivity and Real Compensation,  1960-90 
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shows  much more rapid growth in output per hour. The dashed  lines 
show the product wage-compensation  per hour deflated by the implicit 
deflator for industry output. In both sectors,  the product wage closely 
parallels productivity.  For nonmanufacturing, productivity grows at an 
annual rate of 0.9 percent and the product wage grows at an annual rate 340  Br-ookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
of 1.0  percent  over the 1972-91  period. For manufacturing,  productivity 
grows at a much  faster  annual  rate  of 1.9  percent  while the product  wage 
grows at a similarly  rapid  2.0 percent  over the same period. For both in- 
dustries, the product wage and productivity  grew within one-tenth of 
one percentage  point of each other. 
In neither  sector does the consumption  wage grow at close to the rate 
of productivity  growth. On the other hand, growth  in the consumption 
wage is quite similar  across industries:  0.6 percent a year in nonmanu- 
facturing  versus 0.7 percent  in manufacturing.  Note that the level of the 
consumption  wage is also similar  across industries.  (They need not be 
equal if there are differences  in skill requirements  and other factors be- 
tween the sectors.) The message is clear:  industry  prices move to reflect 
marginal  products,  while consumption  wages tend to equalize  across in- 
dustries. 
One might think, however, that these relative price changes would 
average out across industries so that the average consumption wage 
would track productivity.  This would be the case only if consumption 
exhausted  output.  In particular,  if some output  is invested  and  if the rela- 
tive price of investment  and consumption  goods is changing,  then con- 
sumption  and output  prices will diverge. Indeed, given what is known 
about  productivity  growth  across industries  and about  the composition 
of investment and consumption, one would expect consumption and 
output  prices to diverge. 
Investment  is relatively  goods intensive, and productivity  growth  in 
manufacturing  has, as the figure shows, far outstripped  productivity 
growth  elsewhere in the economy. (The slow growth  in productivity  in 
construction works against the price of investment goods, but not 
enough to offset their advantage, especially given the importance  of 
housing  in consumption.)  Figure  2 in the Bosworth-Perry  paper makes 
the point quite clearly. Consider  two extremes of relative  price change. 
If you are a computer  producer  and a buyer of health care you are not 
doing too well. That, in short, is the situation in which the consumer 
finds  himself  or herself.2 
One very interesting  finding  of this paper  is that the relative price of 
consumption  goods does not follow a steady upward  trend. According 
2.  That health care is both produced  and consumed  does  not deflate this example. 
None of health care is invested (in the NIPA sense),  so the changing relative price of health 
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to the authors'  figure  2, it was flat  until  the mid-  1970s,  ticked down until 
the early 1980s,  and  has trended  up since then. Students  of Baumol's  dis- 
ease might have predicted  an upward  trend over the entire sample. It 
would therefore  be quite interesting  to study in greater  detail  the expla- 
nation  for and  determinants  of this pattern. 
General Discussion 
The paper  generated  substantial  discussion  about  the availability  and 
quality  of data for examining  productivity  and wages. Lawrence Katz 
observed that, on a quarterly  and annual  basis, the Current  Population 
Survey provides an alternative measure of hourly wages. He noted, 
however, that these data pose a further  puzzle, as the CPS measure  of 
hourly  earnings  rises significantly  more slowly than  the measures  based 
on the national  income accounts data, even after  accounting  for the ab- 
sence of fringe  benefits  in the CPS measure.  Barry  Bosworth  noted that 
this difference  arises in the measurement  of hours  per person, since the 
annual figures for earnings and employment are similar in the two 
sources. Katz also suggested  looking  further  at the differences  between 
the growth rates of hourly compensation in the national income ac- 
counts and the employment  cost index. The ECI is a fixed-weight  mea- 
sure while the national  accounts figure  is not but is available  disaggre- 
gated by industry.  By starting  with the disaggregated  national  accounts 
figures, it would be possible to allocate the aggregate  differences be- 
tween these measures  into shifts across sectors and differences  within 
sectors. 
Turning  to specific  biases in standard  measures  of output  and  produc- 
tivity, Robert  Gordon  observed that fixed-weight  output  measures  that 
include computers are biased upward after the base year and biased 
downward  before it, reflecting  the rapid  change in the relative price of 
computers. To avoid the distortion  from the bias that would arise be- 
cause computers  have a much larger  weight in the output  deflator  than 
in the consumption  deflator,  he suggested  using  the Bureau  of Economic 
Analysis's chain-weighted  deflators to assess labor's terms of trade. 
Bosworth  reported  that he had eliminated  this bias more directly, using 
unpublished  data  from  the BEA to completely  remove  the computer  sec- 
tor  from  the national  accounts data  before computing  the relative  prices 
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Gordon  listed two additional  sources of upward  bias in consumption 
deflators:  the likely  failure  to adjust  adequately  for quality  change,  espe- 
cially for consumer  durables;  and outlet substitution  bias. As an exam- 
ple of the latter, when consumers  shift  from buying  toothpaste  at a cor- 
ner drug store to buying it at a supermarket,  the lower price is not 
directly  reflected  in consumption  deflators.  Martin  Baily highlighted  bi- 
ases stemming  from quality  improvements  that result  from information 
technology, many of which are not captured  correctly in the standard 
price measures.  For example, the costs of financial  intermediation  asso- 
ciated with buying  a house have dropped  substantially  in recent years, 
partly  because of the effective application  of computers. Gordon also 
noted that labor's share in national  income has risen slightly over the 
past 20 years, a period during  which its share in nonfarm  private  busi- 
ness output-the  measure  used in the paper-has fallen slightly.  He sug- 
gested that  reconciling  this discrepancy  could help  elucidate  the link  be- 
tween real  wages and productivity. 
Responding to  the general discussion about measurement error, 
Bosworth observed that, for most purposes, the important  question is 
not whether there is significant  bias in the consumer price index, but 
whether  this bias is getting  worse over time. In light  of the fact that  more 
effort is taken today to adjust  for quality, he raised the possibility that 
unmeasured  quality  change  may not cause more  bias in consumption  de- 
flators  today than  30 years ago. 
Katz noted that  the measurement  difficulties  highlighted  by the panel 
could bias international  comparisons  of productivity  and  real  wages. No 
one knows how to adjust  for quality  correctly, and adjustments  are not 
done uniformly  across different nations' accounts. In addition, retail 
outlet substitution  bias could  be much  greater  here  than  abroad,  because 
such substitution has probably been proceeding much faster in the 
United States than  abroad. 
Several members  of the panel focused on the direction  of causality 
among wages, productivity, and employment. Gordon argued  that an 
important  causal link runs from real wage growth to productivity,  the 
opposite of the direction  implicitly  assumed in the paper. In particular, 
he suggested  that  low wages in the United States are  an important  cause 
of relatively slow productivity  growth. Many people are hired to do 
things in this country-like  bag groceries-who  would not be hired in 
European  countries because of labor market  institutions  that make it Barry Bosworth and George L. Per-y  343 
more  expensive  to  hire  low-skilled  workers.  Jeffrey  Sachs  agreed, 
noting that minimum wage rules and union wage agreements reduce low- 
wage employment in Europe and drive up productivity in low-wage  sec- 
tors. He observed that the retail sector in Germany is very capital inten- 
sive, with few people working in retail outlets. 
The panel also raised some broader conceptual  issues.  Robert Hall 
proposed an alternative welfare-based  approach for measuring produc- 
tivity:  because  consumption  is  the  key  to  welfare,  treat  investment 
goods as pure intermediate inputs in the national accounts.  In this treat- 
ment, output would equal the production of consumption  goods plus a 
term to account for the future flow of consumption  goods from invest- 
ment. Productivity would also be calculated with this alternative output 
measure.  In this framework,  Hall added,  productivity  and real wages 
should be computed using a consumption  deflator, rather than the GDP 
deflator that is appropriate if the output measure is total GDP. As Perry 
and Bosworth  showed,  using a consumption  deflator yields a more pes- 
simistic view of recent living standards than using the GDP deflator. 
Finally, James Tobin pointed out that the increase in the relative price 
of consumption  and investment  goods is consistent  with the low saving 
rates observed  in the United  States.  Because  investment  is the means 
through which current consumption  is traded for future consumption,  a 
decline in the relative price of investment goods implies that the price of 
future consumption  has fallen.  With a lower price of future consump- 
tion, a smaller pool of savings today can support a higher level of future 
consumption. 344  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
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